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STORMING THE CASTLE: FERNANDEZ V.
CALIFORNIA AND THE WANING
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Joshua Bornstein∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“The ‘war on terror’ has come home.”1 Surplus military
hardware is being given to local police through the 1033 Program.2
Trained in military tactics, donning military-style clothing and
semi-automatic weapons, and driving mine-resistant ambush
protected (MRAP) vehicles, the police have become “militarized.”3
Shielding American citizens from this new breed of “warrior cop”
stands the constitutional protections enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment and its warrant requirement.
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor
Christopher Hawthorne for his guidance and valuable feedback in preparing this Comment.
Thank you to the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and
dedication. A special thank you to my wife, daughter, parents, and mother-in-law for their
unyielding and unconditional love and support. I stand on the shoulders of giants.
1. See Alex Kane, 11 Chilling Facts About America’s Militarized Police Force, SALON
(Jul. 4, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/04/11_disturbing_facts_about_americas
_militarized_police_force_partner/.
2. See Department of Defense Excess Property Program (DoD 1033), MO. DEP’T OF PUB.
SAFETY, http://www.dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/cjle/dod.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2015)
(explaining that the 1033 Program provides surplus Department of Defense military equipment to
state and local civilian law enforcement agencies); Paul D. Shinkman, Ferguson and the
Militarization of Police, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2014 10:13 AM), http://
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/14/ferguson-and-the-shocking-nature-of-us-police
-militarization.
3. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 45 (2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/criminal
-law-reform/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police-report.
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.4
Once axiomatic, early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence upheld
the proposition that “a man’s house is his castle” such that “[t]he
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown.”5 Yet this maxim has become anachronistic. In its place, a
looser reasonableness standard has taken hold of the Court.6
At issue in Fernandez v. California7 was the reasonableness of a
warrantless search of a home by police.8 After a physically present
tenant refused consent to a warrantless search of his residence, he
was subsequently removed by those same officers. Police thereafter
obtained consent from his cotenant to a warrantless search of the
premises.9 The United States Supreme Court held that, because the
objecting occupant was lawfully removed, police acted reasonably in
seeking consent from the remaining co-occupant.10 In doing so, the
Court narrowed the holding of Georgia v. Randolph11 by requiring
that the objecting occupant remain physically present in order to
vitiate another co-occupant’s countermanding consent to a
warrantless search of the home.12 While the result of Fernandez may
have been predictable by some,13 one must look to the larger social
landscape in order to fully grasp the implications of its holding.
Modern police have become “militarized.” Accordingly, they
may act as if they have military power. As such, the police may treat
ordinary citizens as enemy combatants. With more sophisticated
weaponry, the police have become more dangerous. Therefore,
having the police invade homes produces the potential for greater
risks of actual or perceived police abuse than ever before. After
Fernandez, only the most vigilant citizens, standing guard—and
remaining physically present at the threshold of their homes—can
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
6. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (rejecting the application of the Warrant
Clause and assessing the reasonableness of police officer’s “stop and frisk” of Petitioner).
7. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
8. Id. at 1130–31.
9. Id. at 1130
10. Id. at 1136–37.
11. 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (discussed in detail infra Part III).
12. Id. at 1134–35.
13. See Orin Kerr, My Thoughts on Fernandez v. California, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 5,
2013, 5:32 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/05/fernandez-v-california/ (discussing why
author believes the State would prevail).
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ensure that their privacy remains undisturbed from intruding
government eyes and invasive warrantless searches.
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of
Fernandez. Part III examines the historical background of consent
searches. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Fernandez whereas Part V analyzes its ramifications. Finally, Part VI
concludes that while the Supreme Court correctly decided Fernandez
based upon precedent, the decision ignores current societal realities
and fails to appreciate the unintended consequences that may result
from it.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 12, 2009, at about 11:00 a.m., Abel Lopez cashed a
check in Los Angeles, California.14 A man, who was later identified
as petitioner Walter Fernandez, approached Lopez. After a brief
altercation, Fernandez took out a knife and cut Lopez on the wrist.15
Three or four men ran out of from a nearby building, hit Lopez
repeatedly, and took his phone and wallet.16
Several minutes later, police and paramedics arrived. An
unidentified man directed the police to a nearby apartment
building.17 Detective Kelly Clark and Officer Joseph Cirrito heard
screaming coming from one of the building’s units.18 Clark and
Cirrito knocked on the door.19
Roxanne Rojas opened the door holding a baby.20 Rojas’s face
was red and she had a bump on her nose.21 She appeared to have
been crying.22 Fresh blood was visible on her shirt.23
Officer Cirrito asked Rojas if she would step outside of the
apartment.24 Walter Fernandez, wearing only boxer shorts, then
appeared at the threshold of the door.25 Fernandez stated, “You don’t
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 52 (2012).
Id. at 53.
Id.
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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have any right to come in here. I know my rights.”26 Officer Cirrito
removed Fernandez from the house and placed him under arrest.27
Approximately one hour after Fernandez’s arrest, Detective
Clark returned to the apartment and informed Rojas that Fernandez
had been arrested.28 “Detective Clark requested and received both
oral and written consent from Rojas to search the premises.”29 In the
apartment, the police found gang paraphernalia, a butterfly knife,
boxing gloves, black pants, and a light blue shirt.30 “None of the
items stolen from the victim was ever found.”31
Walter Fernandez was charged with robbery; infliction of
corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or child’s parent; possession
of a firearm by a felon; possession of a short-barreled shotgun; and
felony possession of ammunition.32 Before trial, Fernandez moved to
suppress the evidence found in the apartment as products of a
warrantless search.33 After a hearing, the court denied his motion.34
Fernandez was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment.35
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed.36 The
appellate court found that the holding of Georgia v. Randolph37 was
to be narrowly applied such that the objecting occupant’s physical
presence is “indispensable to the decision of Randolph.”38 Because
Fernandez was no longer physically present in the residence,
Detective Clark was not required to seek a warrant and acted
reasonably by having obtained the consent from Rojas instead.
Accordingly, the evidence found inside the apartment was not the
fruit of an unlawful search.
The California Supreme Court denied Fernandez’s petition for
review.39 However, the United States Supreme Court granted
26. Id.
27. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 53 (2012).
28. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
29. Id.
30. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 54.
31. Id.
32. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1131.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
37. 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that “a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal
to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him”).
38. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 66.
39. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1131.
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certiorari.40 In doing so, the Court sought to clarify the rules
pertaining to consent law as it applies to dueling co-occupants.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
“[T]he Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”41 The
right to privacy is one of the foundational sources of these
emanations.42 The Fourth Amendment directly targets the
objectionable practice of breaking in and searching homes without
warrants issued by magistrates.43 “Its protection consists in requiring
that the inferences drawn to conclude that a search is warranted be
made by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.”44 In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only
if it falls within the ambit of a specific exception to the warrant
requirement.
One such exception is a search conducted pursuant to consent.45
Consent searches are permissible warrantless searches and are
reasonable when the consent voluntarily comes from the sole
occupant of the premises.46 Moreover, warrantless entry is lawful
where police reasonably believe consent comes from a party with
common authority.47
In United States v. Matlock,48 the Supreme Court faced the issue
of consent as it applies to co-inhabitants. In Matlock, the respondent,
Matlock, was arrested on his front lawn.49 While officers did not ask
Matlock for consent to search his home, they did go to the front

40. Id.
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
42. Id. The Fourth Amendment creates a “right to privacy, no less important than any other
right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.” Id. at 485.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
45. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
46. See, e.g., id. at 218; see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165–66 (1974)
(identifying Schneckloth as reaffirming “the principle that the search of property, without warrant
and without probable cause, but with proper consent voluntarily given, is valid under the Fourth
Amendment”); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014) (“it is clear that a
warrantless search is reasonable when the sole occupant of a house or apartment consents”).
47. See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 177 (1990).
48. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
49. Id. at 166.
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door.50 There, they sought and received consent from Matlock’s
housemate.51 Because Matlock was not physically present inside his
home, the Court recognized that “the consent of one who possesses
common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the
absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”52
More recently, in Georgia v. Randolph,53 the Court faced a
slightly different set of facts. Scott Randolph and his estranged wife,
Janet, were engaged in a domestic dispute.54 Janet called the police.55
When the police arrived, Janet informed the officers that her husband
had illegal drugs inside the home.56 The officers asked for consent to
search the house.57 While Janet “readily gave” consent, Scott
“unequivocally refused.”58 The Supreme Court held that “a
physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police
search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow
occupant.”59
The Court based its decision upon “widely shared social
expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of
property, but not controlled by its rules.”60 The Court elaborated:
To begin with, it is fair to say that a caller standing at the
door of shared premises would have no confidence that one
occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter
when a fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.”
Without some very good reason, no sensible person would
go inside under those conditions.61
Thus, the Randolph Court limited the scope of Matlock. When
there is an express refusal by a physically present occupant, “a
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence . . . cannot be
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 170.
547 U.S. 103 (2006).
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
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police by another resident.”62 When there is disagreement
between cotenants, “a resolution must come through voluntary
accommodation, not by appeals to authority.”63
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Fernandez Court faced circumstances that included aspects
of both Matlock and Randolph. Like the respondent in Randolph,
Fernandez expressed a clear objection to a warrantless police search
of his home while he was physically present. Yet, similar to the
circumstances in Matlock, the police received consent from a
co-occupant after Fernandez was no longer within his home. As
such, the Court faced the temporal issues arising from consent
searches as they relate to an objecting, physically present occupant,
who is subsequently removed.
Fernandez argued that a physically present occupant’s stated
objection should remain in force “until officers learn that the
objector no longer wishes to keep the police out of his home.”64 The
Court however, reiterated that Randolph was decided in the interest
of “simple clarity” and “administrability.”65 As such, Fernandez’s
proposal was deemed unreasonable in that it created “a plethora of
practical problems.”66
The Court focused on a hypothetical pair of joint tenants, a
husband and wife.67 The husband is sent to prison for fifteen years.68
Under Fernandez’s proposed rule, the wife would be unable to
consent to a search of her house, presumably, for the next decade.69
This, the Court determined, was unreasonable.70 Another concern for
the Court was the lack of procedural safeguards, which would be
necessary in order to reaffirm a continuing objection.71 Fernandez’s
proposed rule would also have required the police to reasonably

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 120.
Id. at 113–14.
Brief for Petitioner at 8, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) (No. 12-7822).
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121–22).
Id.
Id. at 1135–36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
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determine “whether, after the passage of time, an objector still had
‘common authority.’”72
Lastly, the Court was unwilling to expand Randolph because the
scope of a stated objection remained unclear. Would an occupant’s
objection bind only the officers who were present? Would it be
enforceable against officers who were unaware of the objection?
Would it be limited in any other salient way?73 In the interest of
clarity, administrability, and protecting the rights of an occupant who
is willing to consent,74 the Court held that “an occupant who is
absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as
an occupant who is absent for any other reason.”75 In so holding, the
Court opened the door to the risk of actual or perceived police abuse
amid public mistrust.
V. ANALYSIS
The holding of Fernandez continued the modern diminution of
the warrant requirement.76 Four decades ago, the Supreme Court
announced, “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”77 The
Supreme Court has “long adhered to the view that the warrant
procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions.”78
Since that time, various exceptions to the warrant requirement
have been made.79 Some of these exceptions have been predicated
upon society’s expectations of privacy.80 In measuring these
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1137.
75. Id. at 1134.
76. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that by recording the
petitioner’s telephone conversations in a phone booth without a warrant, the FBI “violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied”), with Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013)
(holding that obtaining the DNA sample of an arrested suspect via a cheek swab is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment). See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness
and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 594–671 (2014) (discussing the shift from
a warrant regime to a reasonableness standard in Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases); see
also Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609,
1665–67 (2012) (discussing the infrequency of warrants used by police when conducting
searches).
77. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
78. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
79. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (discussing the automobile exception).
80. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (articulating that the interior of
an automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one’s
home).
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expectations, the home has been the Court’s barometer, which it uses
to identify the place possessing the greatest expectation of privacy.81
Taken in isolation, Fernandez is a simple application of Matlock.
Yet, when viewed through the lens of history, Fernandez signals the
weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home.
This Part first analyzes the similarities between Fernandez and
Randolph as articulated by the Fernandez dissent. It then argues that
the Fernandez Court’s clarification of Randolph’s dictum opens the
door to the potential of actual or perceived police abuse. Next, it
examines the implications of Fernandez within the current social
landscape of “militarized” police forces. Finally, this Part reflects
upon Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, which examined
Fernandez within the context of property law.
A. Similarities Between Randolph and Fernandez
While Detective Clark could easily have sought a warrant under
the circumstances,82 the Court affirmed the proposition that seeking
consent from Rojas was reasonable under the circumstance despite
Fernandez’s prior objection.83 In doing so, the Court constricted the
holding of Randolph to a narrow exception.84 While the Court treated
Fernandez as substantially distinguishable from Randolph, the facts
of those two cases are not dissimilar.
In her dissent in Fernandez, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
here, as in Randolph, the purpose of the search was purely
evidentiary.85 Moreover, the objecting party clearly expressed his
objection to the officers seeking entrance.86 Thirdly, “the officers
might easily have secured the premises and sought a warrant
permitting them to enter.”87
Unlike the officer in Randolph, the police in Fernandez forcibly
removed the objecting occupant. Yet, with Fernandez in custody,
there was no longer any danger to people on the premises.88 Nor was
81. Id. at 114–15.
82. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1522, 1562 (2013) (noting the “technology-based
developments” enabling expeditious warrants); see also Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126,
1142 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1137 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 1129.
85. Id. at 1139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 (2006)).
88. Id.
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there any “risk that evidence might be destroyed or concealed,
pending request for, and receipt of, a warrant.”89
Despite Fernandez’s physical presence while he was objecting,
the Court deemed Rojas’s subsequent consent reasonable under the
circumstances. Focused on the interests of “simple clarity,” the
majority opinion repudiated the centuries-old position that “a
generalized interest in expedient law enforcement cannot, without
more, justify a warrantless search.”90 The Framers intended to ensure
that “the privacy of a person’s home and property may not be totally
sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the
criminal law.”91 Put differently, the Fourth Amendment was not
written in the interests of simplicity, but to protect society from
unchecked police activity.92
The majority opinion found that Fernandez’s absence took him
outside the purview of an analysis based upon widely shared social
expectations articulated in Randolph.93 In so finding, a simple
mathematical calculation was made; two dueling cotenants minus
one objector equal a reasonable warrantless search.
However, an unintended anomaly that undermines the
protections of the Fourth Amendment may have been created by the
Court’s majority opinion. Police may now easily solve the problem
of dueling cotenants by removing an objecting occupant. Yet,
“Randolph . . . trained on whether a joint occupant had conveyed an
objection to a visitor’s entry, and did not suggest that the objection
could be ignored if the police reappeared post the objector’s
arrest.”94 By ignoring this salient point, veiled in the cloak of
“administrability,” the Court ignored a more time-honored
tradition95: obtaining a warrant through the judicial process.

89. Id.
90. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115 n.5.
91. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1143 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, at 393 (1978)).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 1135 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 1140 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
95. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547 (1999) (examining the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and highlighting
the warrant requirement).

2015]

WANING WARRANT REQUIREMENT

1247

B. Clarifying the Dictum of Randolph
While Fernandez’s assertion of his rights did not cause his
removal,96 the door is now left open for the police to use coercion to
remove an objecting, physically present occupant in order to obtain
consent to conduct a warrantless search of the home from those who
remain on the premises. The Randolph Court stated, in dictum:
So long as there is no evidence that the police have
removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance
specifically to avoid a possible objection, there is practical
value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, one
recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when no fellow
occupant is on hand, the other according dispositive weight
to the fellow occupant’s expressed contrary indication.97
The Fernandez Court addressed this dictum by stating that it
was “best understood to refer to situations in which the removal of
the potential objector is not objectively reasonable.”98 Yet, as noted
by the majority, the Court has historically avoided subjective intent
analysis when it comes to the police.99 Accordingly, as long as police
do not reveal their unlawful intentions for removing an objector—
and an objectively reasonable excuse is plausible—police, then, may
unscrupulously remove an objecting party in order to facilitate the
desired result of proceeding with a warrantless search. Yet, this
possible scenario squarely undermines the intended safeguards
imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, it does not reflect
today’s social landscape.

96. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
97. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 105 (2006).
98. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1128.
99. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 807 (1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s
concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances,
whatever the subjective intent.”); id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554 n.6 (finding subjective intent of the DEA agent irrelevant unless actually conveyed to
the respondent).
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C. Implications of Fernandez: From “Peace Officers”
to “Warrior Cops”
Following the Boston bombings in 2013, the town of
Watertown, Massachusetts, initiated a “shelter-in-place” request.100
Police can be seen on video going door-to-door, ordering civilians
from their homes at gunpoint.101 While this Comment does not
challenge the constitutionality of those public safety measures, the
public misperception created is real and lasting. This misperception
is that police do not need warrants to search homes. Indeed, it
appears one must be well versed in constitutional law in order to
know that there exists a warrant requirement to the Fourth
Amendment.
Similarly, unfolding on live television, the events in Ferguson,
Missouri, have gripped the nation. Following the police shooting of
an unarmed eighteen-year-old, who may have been a robbery suspect
or who may have been an aggressor attacking a police officer,
protesters clashed with police in the streets.102 Over the ensuing
nights, police armed with military equipment sought to quell the
developing unrest.103 Eleven reporters covering the news were
arrested.104 This sparked a national debate about the “Militarization
of Police.”105
The current fear is that a militarized police force will act as if it
has military power. Accordingly, the police may treat Americans as
enemy combatants.106 As the police employ military-style weaponry,
the risks created that innocent people will be harmed increase.107

100. See Nate Rawlings, Was Boston Actually on Lockdown?: What “Shelter in Place” Really
Means, TIME (Apr. 19, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/04/19/was-boston-actually-on-lock
down/.
101. See America, We Need to Talk About the Boston “Lockdown” and Manhunt for Dzhozar
Tsarnaev, POOR RICHARD’S NEWS, http://poorrichardsnews.com/post/48566461810/america-we
-need-to-talk-about-the-boston-lockdown (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
102. See Colby Itkowitz, Timeline of Events in Ferguson, MO, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/timeline-of-events-in-ferguson-mo/2014/08/16/02f37e8c
-2580-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html.
103. See id.
104. See Brian Stelter, 6 More Journalists Arrested in Ferguson Protests, CNN (Aug. 19,
2014, 8:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/ferguson-journalists-arrested/.
105. See Jonathan Topaz, Critics Slam “Militarization” of Police, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2014,
9:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/ferguson-critics-police-militarization-110017
.html.
106. See Kara Dansky, How Many People Must Be Maimed or Killed Before We End the
Militarization of Our Police Forces?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 7, 2014, 4:59 PM),
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Whichever side of the debate one takes, a message has been
delivered to the civilian population: the police have changed.108 No
longer keepers of the peace, the police may now be perceived as
military enforcers armed to control the masses with force. The
civilian population may sense that its civil rights are being trampled.
Yet, this societal change has not been reflected in current Supreme
Court jurisprudence.109 These current events call into question the
very voluntariness of consent searches and the degradation of civil
rights enacted to equally protect all members of society.
A recent report published by the American Civil Liberties Union
focused on the “warrior” mentality of modern police forces.110 “This
shift in culture has been buoyed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
weakening of the Fourth Amendment . . . through a series of
decisions that have given the police increased authority to force their
way into people’s homes, often in drug cases.”111 Indeed, the three
dissenters in Fernandez noted this. “Instead of adhering to the
warrant requirement, today’s decision tells the police they may
dodge it . . . .”112 Aside from the message Fernandez gives to the
police, the message delivered to the American people is that amidst
great public apprehension, police have even greater authority.
Justice Alito concluded his majority opinion by stating,
“Denying someone in Rojas’ position the right to allow the police to
enter her home would also show disrespect for her independence.”113
While the majority was focused on protecting victims of domestic
violence, it ignored the fact that getting a warrant in this situation
would be simple. Moreover, this statement ignores today’s societal

https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform-free-speech/how-many-people-must-be-maimed
-or-killed-we-end-militarization.
107. See id. (discussing Georgia police officers who threw a flashbang grenade into the crib
of 19-month old, Bounkham Phonesavanh, leaving a hole in his chest).
108. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: Is It Time to Reconsider the
Militarization of American Policing?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:44 PM), http://online.wsj
.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323848804578608040780519904 (noting that since 2002,
the Department of Homeland Security has handed out $35 billion in grants, “much of the money
going to purchase military gear such as armored personnel carriers”).
109. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana,
556 U.S. 778 (2009).
110. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 3, at 3.
111. Id.
112. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1139 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1137 (majority opinion).
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sea change; modern police are institutionally more aggressive.114
Citing to Randolph, Justice Alito wrote, “Such an occupant may
want the police to search in order to dispel ‘suspicion raised by
sharing quarters with a criminal.’”115 Yet, a fair reading of Randolph
would show the next paragraph informative.
But society can often have the benefit of these interests
without relying on a theory of consent that ignores an
inhabitant’s refusal to allow a warrantless search. The
co-tenant acting on his own initiative may be able to deliver
evidence to the police . . . and can tell the police what he
knows, for use before a magistrate in getting a warrant.116
One can imagine Roxanne Rojas in 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri.
Police knock on the door. There is no warrant, but officers are asking
to come inside. What happens if Roxanne says, “no”? It is not
unreasonable for one to suspect that this presents a Hobson’s choice.
A wrong answer may lead to arrest. Indeed, Rojas already observed
Fernandez object and then be placed under arrest. Causality issues
aside, the Bill of Rights was intended to protect the People from the
Government, not the other way around. Consent must be voluntarily
given, not gained through subtle coercion.117 These concerns may
easily be dissipated with a neutral magistrate issuing a warrant.
Had Fernandez’s stated refusal remained dispositive as to him,
the police were not without recourse. The majority’s concern about
the “plethora of practical problems” inherent in Fernandez’s proposal
easily subside once police receive a warrant.118 While the majority
opinion upholds the letter of the law, it does damage to the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment. “Power is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police
before they violate the privacy of the home.”119

114. See Justin Moyer, Study: Those Lockstep Riot-Police Phalanxes Make Cops More
Aggressive, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2014), http://washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp
/2014/08/28/researcher-in-ferguson-and-elsewhere-riot-police-may-make-riots-worse/.
115. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1137 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 (2006)).
116. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 116.
117. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
118. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Warrant in police hands, the
Court’s practical problems disappear.”).
119. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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D. Justice Scalia and the Role of Property Law
Writing only for himself, Justice Scalia authored a concurring
opinion in Fernandez based upon property law. In it, he stated that
Fernandez would have been a more difficult case to decide “if it
were established that property law did not give petitioner’s cotenant
the right to admit visitors over petitioner’s objection.”120 It could not
be shown that a guest would commit a trespass where one cotenant
invited the guest to enter while the other objected.121
Yet, while property law influences the Court’s decision—and
Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment opinions as of late122—it is
important to distinguish “when the police may enter without
committing a trespass, and when the police may enter to search for
evidence.”123 A police officer may approach a home and knock
because it is “no more than any private citizen might do.”124
Searching for evidence, however, is a power exclusive to law
enforcement. Even if property law gives a license to the police so as
to not commit a trespass, “that unwelcome[d] visitor’s license would
hardly include free rein to rummage through the dwelling in search
of evidence and contraband.”125
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized the powerful
influences of a “police-dominated atmosphere.”126 While limited to
custodial interrogation, such a description arguably reflects the new
social paradigm of militarized police. Accordingly, a finer distinction
should be made between what constitutes a mere trespass and what
police actions are tolerable for evidentiary purposes. The Court,
however, appears unwilling to make such a clear distinction for fear
that it would endanger victims of domestic violence by preventing
police from entering.127 However, no question is raised about
the authority of the police to enter a home in order to protect a
victim from domestic violence. Such exigent circumstances are
120. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1137–38 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1138.
122. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013).
123. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006).
124. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011).
125. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966).
127. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1137 (“Having beaten Rojas, petitioner would bar her from
[consenting to a police search of their shared home after petitioner’s refusal]. The Fourth
Amendment does not give him that power.”).
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well-recognized exceptions.128 The situation presented by Fernandez
was one in which no exigency existed. As such, mere trespass theory
provides little assurances for evidentiary protections.
VI. CONCLUSION
In reducing Randolph to a “narrow exception,” the Fernandez
Court further facilitated the modern waning of the warrant
requirement. Expressed in terms of reasonableness, the Court
articulated a rule with the aims of simple clarity, administrability,
and protecting victims of domestic violence. Yet, embedded within
its opinion, the majority behaved as if the police abuses from which
the Court once protected the public no longer exist. Such a rule
ignores contemporary societal ills. While the outcome of Fernandez
may have been a logical extension of Matlock, Fernandez’s broader
implications that diminish citizens’ protections in the home from
warrantless searches loom large. It remains to be seen whether the
Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home—the castle fortified by
the Constitution—has, indeed, been besieged.

128. See, e.g., Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118.

